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ABSTRACT 
Population growth and size have remained the focus of debate for 
centuries but the recent demographic transition in developing countries has 
made social scientists take note of the changing age structure of the population 
as well. As a result of declining population growth and consequent changes in 
age structure, the proportion of working-age population is increasing in most 
developing countries, with an associated decline in the dependent age 
population, offering a window of opportunity to these countries that is referred 
to as the “demographic dividend”.  
Pakistan is also going through the demographic transition, and is 
experiencing a once-in-a-lifetime demographic dividend as the working-age 
population bulges and the dependency ratio declines. This paper looks into the 
demographic dividend available to Pakistan and its implications for the country, 
mainly through three mechanisms: labour supply, savings, and human capital. 
For economic benefits to materialise, there is a need for policies dealing with 
education, public health, and those that promote labour market flexibility and 
provide incentives for investment and savings. On the contrary, if appropriate 
policies are not formulated, the demographic dividend might in fact be a cost, 
leading to unemployment and an  unbearable strain on education, health, and old 
age security.  
 
 Keywords: Demographic dividend, age-structure, demographic transition,                                       
Pakistan 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Malthus gave his apocalyptic views, in the late 18th century, 
on ever-increasing population and starvation, a debate has persisted over the 
relation between population growth and economic growth and development. 
Social scientists, mainly economists and demographers, continue to argue 
whether population growth encourages, discourages or is independent of 
economic growth1. The focus of this debate however has mainly remained 
confined to population size and growth, giving little consideration to the age 
structure of the population. Bringing age structure dynamics in this debate can 
be attributed to Coale and Hoover (1958), who argued that sustained high 
fertility and falling mortality make governments and households burdened with 
high youth dependency rates, lowering tax revenues and household savings, 
respectively.  
Economists have recently begun to focus on the impact of changing age 
structure of the population moving beyond the Malthusian emphasis on 
population growth [Mason (2005); Birdsall, et al. (2001); Sachs (2002); Bloom 
and Canning (1999); Bloom and Freeman (1986); Lee  (2003); Bloom and Sachs 
(1998); and Bloom and Williamson (1998)].  The interest in relation between 
population change and economic growth has reignited because of the 
demographic transition taking place in the developing countries, which are at 
varying stages in experiencing declining fertility and mortality rates. The life 
cycle consumption model suggests that different age groups in a population have 
different economic implications. The young need investment in health and 
education, adults supply labour, income and savings and at old ages there is a 
                                                 
Acknowledgements: The author is indebted to Dr Nadeem Ul Haque for his comments and 
suggestions on this paper. All errors and omissions, of course, remain the sole responsibility of the 
author.  
1The views generated by this debate can be classified into three schools of thought. (1) The 
pessimists: who believe that population growth restricts economic growth. They argue that world 
with its fixed resources for growing food would not be able to feed the growing population leading 
to widespread starvation and death. Proponents of this view include Malthus (1798) and Ehrlich 
(1968). (2) The optimists: who think that population growth can promote economic growth. Kuznets 
(1967), Simon (1981, 1986), and Boserup (1981) are some who subscribe to this view, as does 
Srinivasan (1988) who attributes lack of economic growth more to inappropriate institutions and 
policies than to rapid population growth. (3) The neutralists: who propose that population growth 
has no relation with economic growth. They, including, Kelly and Schmidt (1995),  Kelley (2001) 
and Bloom and Freeman (1986), propose that controlling for factors like educational attainment, 
openness to trade and civil institutions, there is little evidence available that population growth 
promotes or restricts economic growth.  
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need for retirement income and, again, a requirement to invest in health. As the 
relative size of each of these age groups change in the population similar is the 
respective impact of the economic behaviour associated with different ages. This 
relation is summarised in the lifecycle income and consumption model, a 
schematic representation of which can be found in Figure I. As a result of 
declining population growth and consequent changes in age structure, the 
proportion of working age population is increasing in most developing 
countries, offering a window of opportunity to these countries, referred to as the 
‘demographic dividend’.  
 
Fig. I. Life-cycle Income and Consumption 
 
Source: Adapted from Bloom, et al. (2001).  
 
The demographic dividend can be defined as the potential economic 
benefit offered by changes in the age structure of the population, during the 
demographic transition, when there is an increase in working age population and 
an associated decline in the dependent age population. What needs to be 
emphasised here is that economic gains from demographic dividend are not 
certain, as the term might misleadingly imply. Economic returns are not solely 
function of demographic dividend. For economic benefits to materialise there is 
a need for policies dealing with education, public health and those that promote 
labour market flexibility, and provide incentives for investment and savings. On 
the contrary, if appropriate policies are not formulated demographic dividend 
might, in fact, be a cost, leading to unemployment and an  unbearable strain on 
education, health and old age security.  
Pakistan is also going through the demographic transition, with fertility 
rates finally showing a declining trend. It is now experiencing a once in a 
lifetime demographic dividend as the working age population bulges and the 
dependency ratio declines. This paper looks into the demographic dividend 
being offered to Pakistan and what it holds for the country in future. The paper 
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is divided into five sections. After giving an introduction to the topic, section 
two gives a brief account of the literature on issues related to demographic 
dividend. Section three looks into the demographic evolution leading to the 
demographic dividend in Pakistan, while section four examines the key 
mechanisms that can influence the ability to capitalise on the demographic 
dividend in Pakistan. The last section deals with conclusions of the study and 
policy implications that emerge from it.  
 
I. WHAT IS THE “DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND”? 
The term ‘demographic dividend’ has its origin in a study of the East 
Asian growth carried out by David Bloom and Jeffrey Williamson [Bloom and 
Williamson (1998)]. Bloom and Williamson used aggregate quantitative data to 
carry out cross-country econometric regressions with the objective of calculating 
the contribution made by age structure dynamics to the boom in the East Asian 
economic growth late last century. They identified the role of changing age-
structure in economic take-off in East Asia, and found demographic dividend to 
account for between one-fourth and two-fifths of East Asia’s “economic 
miracle” [Bloom and Sachs (1998); Bloom and Williamson (1998); and Bloom, 
Canning, and Malaney (2000)]. And later the work by Mason (2001) confirmed 
the results of the analyses carried out by Bloom and colleagues.  
The demographic dividend occurs when decline in birth rate, which 
normally follows mortality decline with the onset of the demographic transition, 
leads to changes in age structure of a population. The impact of changes in crude 
death rate and crude birth rate over the demographic transition cycle is not fully 
encapsulated by population growth rate alone. Three important demographic 
scenarios result because of the lag between changes in fertility and mortality 
rates. One is a temporary rise and a subsequent fall in population growth rate. 
The other is a delayed change in the ratio of working age population to total 
population. During the first phase, characterised by a decline in crude death rate 
from the pre-demographic transition level, the working age ratio undergoes an 
initial decline as the decline in crude death rate tends to be concentrated in early 
childhood, creating a population bulge in the young age groups. During the 
second phase of the demographic transition, in which crude birth rate declines 
from the pre-demographic transition level, the population bulge enters and stays 
in the working age group, and the rate of growth of the working age population 
surpass that of total population, with a consequent increase in the working age 
ratio. During the third phase the population bulge moves out of the working age 
group and enters the old age category. The gap between the rates of growth in 
the working age population and total population is now reversed resulting in a 
decline in the working age ratio.  
Korea’s experience of demographic transition can be taken as a case to 
illustrate the process of changing age-structure, presented in Figure II. 
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Demographic transition in Korea followed a very steep path, turning one of the 
youngest populations out of the more developed economies in 1950s into one of 
the oldest by the middle of the 21st century [Phang (2005)]. Rapid fertility 
decline and consistent decrease in mortality shrunk the base of the population in 
Korea, leading first to a bulge in the working age population (that is, the 
“demographic dividend” phase) and then to aging of the population.  
 
Fig. II.  Korea, 1950-2050: from ‘Demographic Dividend’  
to an Old Population 
1950 2000 2025 2050 
  
 
The essence of demographic dividend thus is that the young and the old 
tend to consume more than they produce, unlike working age population, who 
contribute more to output and savings than they consume [Mason (1988); 
Higgins (1998); Higgins and Williamson (1997); Kelley and Schmidt (1996); 
Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) and Leff (1969)]. Consequently, the value of 
output per capita tends to increase when the population of working age 
individuals is relatively large and tends to decrease when a relatively large part 
of the population consists of young and elderly dependents. This can be best 
summarised in the words of Bloom and Williamson (1998, p. 429) when they 
say:  
“…… in the early stages of the demographic transition, rising youth 
dependency burdens and falling shares of working-age adults diminish 
the growth of per capita income as the transition proceeds, falling youth 
dependency burdens and rising shares of working-age adults promote the 
growth of per capita income. The early burden of having few workers and 
savers becomes a potential gift, as is proportionately high share of 
working-age adults. Later, the economic gift dissipates, as the share of 
elderly rises”.   
The ‘demographic dividend’ leads to opportunities for growth in output 
per capita in two principal ways. One, there is an age-structure impact on total 
GDP due to increasing proportion of working-age group in total population, 
increasing the ratio of producers to consumers. This situation, naturally, is 
extremely favourable to the growth of output per capita [Bloom, et al. (2001)]. 
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Fertility decline can also add to this ‘composition effect’ by relieving women 
from their childbearing responsibilities and enabling them to enter the labour 
market.  
Two, there are “behavioural effects” of changing age structure, as 
referred to by Bloom and Williamson (1998). This behavioural impact reflects 
itself in many ways. An increasing proportion of working-age individuals in a 
population enhances overall productivity, with improved skill level of the 
workers contributing to it. As discussed earlier, there are changes in aggregate 
saving and consumption following the life cycle pattern. Increase in savings can 
make capital more available and thus relatively cheaper.  Another behavioural 
effect can arise from the changing attitudes to the status of females, leading to 
increased female enrolment and consequently more educated females in the 
labour force.  The sum total of all these behavioural effects has the potential to 
further increase per capita output.  
It is worth repeating the fact that demographic dividend is a time specific 
window of opportunity, and is not going to last forever. With time, the age-
structure changes again, as the large adult population grows old, and become 
less productive. At this stage the dependency ratio rises again, as does the level 
of intergenerational transfers, but in the reverse direction. It is now a question of 
the care and support needs of the aged, instead of providing sustenance to a 
large young population. It is important to avail the opportunity provided by this 
demographic scenario because countries that do not take advantage of the 
dividend will face serious consequences of their failure, including 
unemployment, and lack of old age security. As aptly put by Mason, “The 
demographic dividend is a transitory phenomenon— a ‘window of opportunity’. 
Moreover, seizing the opportunities implicit in the dividend is not just about 
creating opportunities for the young. Increasingly successful policies for 
stimulating economic growth and reducing poverty will be about policies for the 
elderly” (2005, p. 6).  
The demographic dividend is thought to be delivered through the 
interplay of three interconnected mechanisms [Bloom, et al. (2001)]. These are: 
Labour Supply: As the demographic transition follows its path, children 
born during the high fertility years enter adult life and become workers. 
However, sound policies are needed to be in place before the demographic 
transition to train and educate them, so that they are not left unemployed. 
Women are more likely to enter the labour force as fertility rates decline and 
they are released from their childrearing responsibilities sooner to be able to be 
part of the labour force.  Also, as the transition moves forward, younger women 
may tend to become better educated than those in the older cohorts, and are thus 
more productive in the labour force. This assumes that provision would be made 
to create more jobs and accommodate the growing numbers of workers entering 
the labour force, thus seizing the ‘dividends’ of the changing age-structure.  
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Savings: The demographic transition also promotes the growth of 
savings, improving the country’s ability for investment and growth. Prime 
working-age adults have the potential to earn more and thus can save more than 
new entrants to the labour market, which can encourage personal and national 
savings. Deaton and Paxson (1997) believe that people tend to save more 
between the ages of 40 and 65, when they are less likely to be investing in their 
young children and the need to prepare for their retirement is becoming more 
dominant.  Likewise, improved health and longevity, which are by-products of 
the demographic transition, make savings easier and more attractive. Personal 
savings can continue to grow and be able to serve as a source of investment that 
can stimulate economic growth, as was the case in the East Asian countries 
[Krugman (1994); Higgins (1998) and Kelley and Schmidt (1995, 1996).  
Countries can thus move from being heavily dependent on external finance to a 
position of relative financial self-sufficiency. 
Human Capital: Demographic transition affects investment in 
human capital. These effects are least evident but have far-reaching 
implications. Increase in life expectancy makes people think differently 
about education, family, retirement, status and role of women and labour 
force participation. Fewer children means better educated ones as more 
investment is allocated to each individual child, including girl child, 
making them more productive workers once they enter the labour force.  
Female participation in the labour force enhances the social status and 
personal and financial independence of women which in turn improves the 
productivity of a population as a whole.  
All these mechanisms, however, depend on the policy environment of 
the country. Health and education can only improve if there is a provision 
for quality health and education. Likewise, savings can only increase if 
people have access to acceptable savings mechanisms and have confidence 
in the domestic financial markets [Bloom, et al. (2001)]. It is these 
institutional differences that make a certain country take full benefit of the 
‘dividend’ provided by the demographic change while some do not, 
examples being the East Asian and Latin American countries, respectively 
[Phang (2005)].  
The East Asian experience is an example for other countries. The East 
Asian countries were the first to complete the demographic transition outside the 
Western countries. The fertility decline in this region was unusually sharp and 
the development success of the region is unparalleled [Mason (2005)]. These 
countries progressed not just in per capita income but also health, education, 
poverty reduction and income equality. The key to their success was human 
resource base, success at employment growth and high rates of saving and 
investment [Feeney and Mason (2001); Bauer (2001)]. The East Asian 
“economic miracle” shows how reduced fertility can help create conditions for 
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vigorous economic growth. Declining mortality, followed by declines in 
fertility, resulted in a rapid demographic transition in the region between 1965 
and 1990 and the working-age population grew four times faster than the 
dependent population. Strong educational systems and trade liberalisation 
policies enabled national economies to absorb this bulge in the workforce 
numbers. The demographic dividend was fully seized, evident in the region’s 
spectacular economic boom, with the real per capita income growth averaging 
six percent per year between 1965 and 1990. As stated earlier, the demographic 
dividend accounted for approximately one-fourth to two-fifths of the economic 
growth in the East Asian region [Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000); Bloom, 
Canning, and Sevilla (2003); and Mason (2005)]. 
 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND  
THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is among those Asian countries that made late entry to the 
demographic transition. Using the UN projections (2005), this section looks into 
what the future may hold for Pakistan demographically. UN projections provide 
three variants—low, medium and high—and the present paper mainly uses the 
medium variant to analyse the dividend demography has offered Pakistan, 
however scenarios based on low and high variants are provided in Appendix.2 
Since projections are as good as the assumptions they are based on, they can 
never claim to be an exact reflection of future happenings, yet they do give some 
indication of what things could look like.    
Demographic transition is characterised by the decline in mortality 
followed by the decline in fertility, and it is the difference between the two 
that defines the natural increase in a population. Figure III shows the long-
term trend in crude birth rate (CBR) and crude death rate (CDR) in Pakistan. 
The CBR peaked at about 45 in the late 1970s to early 1980s, when the 
demographic transition took off and decreased to 30 births per 1000 
population by the year 2006. By 2050 it is expected to almost half, at 16 births 
per 1000 population. The CDR has progressively declined from 24 deaths per 
1000 population in 1950 to approximately eight in the year 2006. It will 
continue to decline before increasing again after year 2045. This increase 
would be due to the changing age structure of the population, which would 
then have a bigger proportion of elderly population.  
                                                 
2Population projections ascribed to by sources in Government of Pakistan correspond more 
to the low variant of the UN projections. Medium variants of UN population projections are, 
however, primarily used in this paper to have a more balanced view of the future instead of using the 
low or high variant that in a way present the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ case scenarios for Pakistan. Details 
regarding the low and high variants of population projection in Pakistan, however, could be found in 
the Appendix.  
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Fig. III. Crude Death and Crude Birth Rates: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
5
15
25
35
45
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CBR
CDR
 
Source: Medium variant: UN (2005). 
 
Figure III showed that natural increase in the population was largest in 
the 1980s, and Figure IV presents this trend even more clearly, where the 
population growth rate could be found peaking in 1980s, hovering around 3.5 
percent increase per annum. The growth rate gradually begins to decline after 
mid-1980s, reaching a growth rate of two percent per annum by the year 2006. 
The population is expected to keep growing till 2050 albeit at a slower rate of 
0.78 percent per annum [medium variant, UN (2005)]. The low and high 
variants project a growth rate of 1.26 and 0.25, respectively, by the year 2050 
(Figure IV).  
Figure IV also shows the historical trend of the total fertility rate 
(TFR) of Pakistan. It was during the 1990s that Pakistan had a major shift in 
fertility decline, with the rate falling from over six children per woman to 
around 4.5 children per woman by the year 2000. The TFR is expected to 
continue to fall, reaching a near replacement level by 2050, according to the 
medium variant [UN (2005)]. The low and high variant foresees a TFR of 
1.69 and 2.69 children per woman by 2050 in Pakistan (Figure IV). If the 
low variant of population projection is translated into reality, Pakistan 
should reach replacement level fertility by 2027, as against 2047 projected 
by the medium variant [UN (2005)]. 
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Fig. IV.  Total Fertility Rate and Population Growth Rate:  
Pakistan, 1950-2050 
Total Fertility Rate Annual Population Growth Rate 
 
Source: High, medium and low variant: UN (2005). 
 
Needless to say, fertility decline in Pakistan has lagged far behind 
many countries in Asia, even in South Asia. However, now that the 
demographic transition is finally taking place, corresponding changes are 
starting to appear in the age-structure of the population. With the shrinking 
young age population the proportion of working age population is gradually 
increasing, as can be seen from Figure V. With the percentage share of 52 
percent in the late 80s to early 90s, the proportion of working age population 
(15–64 years) has reached almost 59 percent in 2006. The share of working 
age population will peak in 2045 to 68 percent before starting to decline 
again, this time the reason being the growing old age population share 
instead of young. The approximately three percent old age population share 
would increase to almost 10 percent by 2050 in Pakistan [medium variant, 
UN (2005)]. The young age population share with decreasing fertility, 
naturally, shows a declining trend. From the current 38 percent in the total 
population the young population is expected to comprise only 23 percent of 
the country’s population by 2050. Looking at the low and high variants we 
find 18 and 27 percent of the population, respectively, comprising young 
people by 2050 (see Figure A-I).  
These trends in fertility and mortality rates in the country indicate an 
increasing median age of the population. From a youngish median age of 20 
years in 2006, it is projected to increase to an adult 33 years by 2050 (medium 
variant). As can be seen from Figure V, the median age of the population in 
Pakistan started to increase in the 1990s and, with decreasing fertility level, the 
trend will continue in future. If the demographic transition follows a slower path 
in the country, the median age would  be around 29 years by 2050, compared to 
38 years if the fertility decline is more rapid (Figure V).  
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Fig. V.  Percentage Share of Young, Working-age, and Old Population  
and Median Age of Population: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
Share of Different Age Groups in 
Population (%) 
Medium Variant 
Median Age (Years) 
High, Low, and Medium Variant 
 
Source: Based on UN (2005). 
 
The changing age structure of the population can be best represented in 
population pyramids. Figure VI shows the changing age structure of population 
in Pakistan over a century (for years 1950, 2000, 2025 and 2050). We can see 
that not much fertility decline took place from 1950 to 2000 and the age 
structure still appears like a classic pyramid, however, the base does show a 
slight shrinking. In the 25 years after 2000, the population age structure shows 
an apparent change, with the base losing its pyramid appearance. In the 
subsequent twenty-five years the age structure is projected to change drastically, 
from what it looked like fifty years earlier, and approach an almost cylindrical 
shape. The decreasing fertility makes the base lighter and due to the past high 
fertility rates an echo generation, which now comprises working age adults, 
moves its way through the demographic evolution of the country’s population, 
making the centre heavy. The top of the pyramid, though still narrow, shows a 
widening trend with the share of the elderly gradually increasing in the 
population.  
 
Fig. VI.  Population Pyramids of Pakistan: Changes over Time, 1950-2050 
1950 2000 2025 2050 
  
Source: Based on medium variant, UN (2005). 
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All these demographic processes have resulted in decreasing the 
dependency ratio in the country. As we saw in Figure V, the proportion of the 
population in working ages (15–64 years) continues to increase while those in 
the younger ages (0–14) decrease. The proportion of the elderly in the total 
population is projected to show a substantial increase only after 2025. It would 
be then the increasing elderly population that would take the dependency ratios 
higher as against the 20th century when it was mainly young dependency that 
contributed to the total dependency ratio.  Figure VII shows the old, young and 
total dependency ratios in Pakistan projected till the year 2050. We can see the 
total dependency falling in the late 1990s till almost middle of the 21st century, 
along with the young dependency, on the other hand the old dependency ratio 
shows an increasing trend after 2025, making the total dependency ratio increase 
again towards the middle of this century.3  
 
Fig. VII.  Dependency Ratio, Working-age and Population  
Growth Rate: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
Dependency Ratio: Old, Young and 
Total 
Labour Force and Population Growth 
Rate 
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Total dependency
Young dependency
Old dependency
Source: Based on medium variant UN (2005). 
 
A period of high population growth precedes the period in which there is 
a large share of working age individuals in the population. As Bloom, et al. 
(2001) point out, this period is of extreme importance to a country’s income 
growth prospects. Policies need to be formulated taking into account the relation 
between economic development and the effects of changing age structure of the 
population. This lag in growth that Bloom and colleagues talk about can be 
witnessed in Figure VII where the surge in the growth of working age 
population in Pakistan follows the high population growth rate with a lag of 
roughly 20 years (Figure VII). This surge in the working age population is the 
“echo” of the high population growth in the past. The comparatively higher 
                                                 
3For dependency ratios based on low and high variants of population projections see Figure 
A-2.  
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growth rate of working age population during the late 1990s and roughly the 
first half of 2000s offer Pakistan a demographic dividend to take economic 
benefit from.  
Just like there is gradation in dependency there is gradation in the 
demographic dividend offered to a country. A 70 year old is a dependent but to a 
smaller degree than a 90 year old [Mason (2005)]. Likewise, demographic 
dividend goes through a gradation of available opportunities. Theoretically, 
demographic dividend is the difference between the rate of growth of working 
age population and total population. When the difference is in favour of working 
age population, it is considered to be a window of opportunity offered by 
country’s demography to make use of for economic growth [Mason (2005)]. 
Figure VIII shows that Pakistan’s ‘window of opportunity’ opened in 1990 and 
is projected to shut by year 2045 (the period denoted by the box in Figure VIII). 
The almost fifty-year long ‘offer’ is at its best currently (that is early 2000s) 
before starting to withdraw and ultimately end in 2045 (Figure VIII).4  
 
Fig. VIII.  Pakistan: Timing and Duration of the Demographic Dividend 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
 
Source: Based on medium variant UN (2005).  
Note: Inset box signifies the period of demographic dividend.  
 
III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE  
DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND FOR PAKISTAN 
Although population of Pakistan is still increasing, the changing age 
structure offers it an opportunity to avail for economic growth. According to 
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2001), while the population growth has a negative 
impact on per capita income growth, this effect is counteracted by the positive 
effect from growth in the share of the population that is economically active. 
Mason (2001), however, gives a counter-argument, positing a reverse causal 
                                                 
4See Appendix Table A-1 for high, low and medium projection variants for the timing and 
duration of demographic dividend.  
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mechanism in which rapid economic development and accompanied social 
change (modernisation, urbanisation, and changes in demographic behaviour) 
might have initiated or facilitated demographic transition. But, when the two 
processes (demographic change and economic development) take place almost 
at the same time, it could be a futile effort to draw a valid causal flow between 
the two. Therefore, instead of trying to treat the demographic change as the 
source of bringing about economic development in Pakistan, we will see what 
opportunities it offers and what are the implications of this offer for the country.    
As has been previously emphasised, the demographic dividend is not 
inevitable but has to be earned and is also time-limited. If opportune policies are 
not adopted and efficiently applied, the opportunity would be missed. Failure to 
grab the opportunity would not only be a letdown on its own but adverse effects 
could also set in instead. If a right environment is provided, the population 
dividend can be delivered through increased and/or improved (i) labour supply, 
(ii) savings, and (iii) human capital [Bloom, et al. (2001); Mason (2005)].  
Pakistan’s projected period of ‘demographic dividend’ is from 1990-2045 
(see Figure VIII), which means that 15 years of this opportunity have already gone 
by. We now look into the implications of demographic dividend for Pakistan in the 
above-mentioned three key areas, namely, labour supply, human capital and savings.  
 
Labour Supply 
Demographic transition passes through a phase when it adds to the labour 
force in two ways. One, the number of people in the working ages gets bigger, 
and two, women are more likely to enter the labour market as fertility level 
declines. However, it depends on the ability of the market and workers to make 
able use of this scenario.  
 
Fig. IX. Pakistan: Age-sex-specific Labour Force Participation Rates 
and Trend of Sex-specific Labour Force Participation  
Rates over a Decade 
Age-sex Specific LFPRs              
2005-2006 
LFPRs: Total, male and female    
1992-2005 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2005-2006; Economic Survey 2005-2006.  
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Figure IX presents the age-sex specific labour force participation rates 
(LFPRs) for the year 2005-2006. The male curve shows a typical inverted-U 
shape, with the LFPR peaking between 25–50 years of age. The female 
participation remains low throughout their lifespan, showing no particular 
pattern. This trend of low female labour participation has persisted over time. As 
we can see in Figure IX, female LFPR does show a slight increasing trend but 
has continued to remain low over the last decade. Benefits of demographic 
dividend cannot be reaped with half the population not fully active in the labour 
market as is prevalent in the Pakistan. With only one-fifth of females in working 
ages actually active in the labour market means a waste of resources that could 
be used to avail the opportunity the changing demography is offering Pakistan.  
Being part of the labour market is only beneficial if there is ability in the 
market to absorb these workers. In Figure X we see that despite low 
participation rates among females, rate of unemployment is much higher for 
them than males. The unemployment rates are especially worth noting among 
older women (Figure X). Unemployment rates climb for older ages but are 
especially pronounced among women aged 60 and above. This trend has serious 
implications for the country as the logical end of demographic transition is aging 
of the population. Shrinking job opportunities at older ages stress the need for 
flexibility not only in the labour market but also in the labour force to cope with 
the scenario that is bound to take place once the ‘echo generation’ gets old.  
 
Fig. X. Pakistan: Age-sex-specific Unemployment Rates and  
Unemployment Trends over Years 
Age-sex Specific Unemployment Rates 
2005-2006 
Unemployment Rate: 1995-2005 
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Source: Labour Force Survey 2005-2006; Economic Survey 2005-2006.  
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groups in the country. Would the labour market be able to provide gainful 
employment to all those who are willing to work? Would these teeming numbers be 
actually a “dividend” or would they be more of a threat? The increasing 
unemployment rate in the country, with its growing population in the working-ages, 
raises serious questions about the state of employment in future. 
 
Fig. XI.  Available Workers and Those Active in the Labour  
Market, 2005-2050 
Projected Population Aged 15-64: 
 Total, Male,  
and Female  (millions) 
Projected Population Actually Active 
in Labour Market: Total, Male, and 
Female (millions) 
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Source: Based on medium variant, UN (2005) and Labour Force Survey 2005-2006.  
 
Figure XI shows the projected population in the working age groups. 
Based on the medium variant, by the year 2030, which is not in that distant 
future, there would be 175 million potential workers in the population, 
comprising 90 million males and 85 million females, increasing to a total of 221 
million individuals in working ages by 2050. These are huge numbers to 
accommodate in the labour market in the absence of any sound planning. Given 
that no population has a 100 percent participation rate, for the sake of having a 
crude estimate we apply the current LFPRs, total, male and female, to the 
projected populations till 2050. Results of this exercise are presented in Figure 
XI. Despite projecting the current low female participations rates into the future, 
a total of roughly 105 million people would be part of the labour force by 2030, 
increasing to 140 million by 2050. That is roughly five and seven times, 
respectively, the whole population of Australia at present. It would not be wrong 
to say that it is a very conservative estimate as female LFPRs are bound to 
increase with time, adding to the total number of those looking for employment. 
If we take into consideration the scenario presented by the high variant the 
situation becomes even more threatening, with even bigger numbers entering the 
working age groups and seeking employment.5 
                                                 
5For projected population in working ages and those active in the labour market based on 
low and high variants can be seen from Figure A-3 and A-4.   
 16 
All this can pose a dilemma for the policy-makers in the country. Full 
benefits offered by the demographic dividend cannot be gained unless labour 
force participation rates are improved, but increased labour force participation 
implies generating employment for these huge numbers, which by no means is 
an easy task.  
 
Savings 
Lifecycle variations in productivity lead individuals to vary their savings 
over their lifetime in order to accommodate their consumption [Lee, Mason, and 
Miller (2000)]. Demographic transition thus encourages savings which in turn 
can boost country’s ability for investment and growth. Leff (1969) did 
pioneering work in establishing relation between dependency ratio and savings, 
and found an inverse association between the two. The basic logic behind the 
negative association being that young and old consume more than they produce, 
while working-age people produce more than they consume and can save, which 
can contribute to the economic growth [Bloom, et al. (2001); Deaton and Paxson  
(1997); Williamson and Higgins (2001); Bloom and Canning (1999); Bloom and 
Williamson (1998); and Kelley and Schmidt (1995)]. However, not everyone 
agrees with this logic [like Kelley (1998)]. But as Mason, talking about a 
population’s ability and willingness to save, rightly states, “The changes in age 
structure define possibilities, but by themselves do not determine the outcomes” 
(2005a, p. 22).  
Pakistan’s economic performance during the last three decades has been 
impressive with the real GNP growing at an average rate of six percent per 
annum. The saving rate, however, continues to show an almost horizontal trend 
over the years [Pakistan (2006); State Bank (2006)]. Household income has been 
found to be the prime factor influencing saving behaviour in Pakistan and 
various studies found a strong inverse relation between dependency ratio and 
savings in the country [Ahmed and Asghar (2004); Khan and Nasir (1999); 
Burney and Khan (1992); Siddique and Siddique (1993); and Khan, Hasan, and 
Malik (1992)].  
All micro-studies in Pakistan on saving behaviour take household as the 
unit of analysis which, by design, cannot explicitly measure the effect of 
changing age-structure of the population on savings, as they generally take the 
age of the head of the household to estimate the relation between age and 
savings. Lifecycle profiles are ideally constructed for individuals and not 
households. As also found out by Deaton and Paxson (1997) while analysing 
savings in Taiwan, a hump-shaped age-saving profile exists in the population. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that greater dependency ratio depresses 
savings.  
A more precise estimation of demographic dividend requires an age 
profile of: (i) age distribution; (ii) consumption; and (iii) income. For Pakistan 
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such an exercise would be very cumbersome at present due to the absence of any 
age-specific consumption data and would require a lot of indirect estimation 
(which is beyond the scope of this paper and would be dealt with separately). No 
matter what the method of estimation is, two things are almost certain. One, 
there is an inverse relation between dependency ratio and savings, and two, 
which is more significant, that savings are important at both national and 
personal level. At the national level, savings are needed to finance investment 
and growth, while at the personal level they are vital to maintain a standard of 
living through the period of retirement. This is truer for Pakistan where no state 
sponsored social security exists and individuals are primarily reliant on their 
own savings during older ages.  
Aging of population is the inevitable end of demographic transition, and 
Pakistan, albeit slowly, is moving towards it. In the absence of any state planned 
old age security system and the existing low saving rates in the country, the 
demographic dividend can turn into a demographic nightmare for majority of the 
elderly if they do not increase their savings during their prime working age.  
 
Human Capital 
It is premised that demographic transition has significant effect on 
investment in human capital. Increasing life expectancy makes parents invest 
more in their children’s human capital as the premium of higher education 
increases and lasts longer. As a consequence, the labour force becomes more 
productive, gets higher wages and there is improvement in the standard of living 
[Bloom, et al. (2001)].  With shrinking of young population pressure on the 
education system is reduced, which can help countries to invest more in 
improving the quality of education and in higher levels, rather than in making 
investment in basic education. It cannot be emphasised enough that it is not the 
quantity but the quality of education that is more important for human capital 
formation and economic growth [Dupreiz (2003)]. 
With half the population still illiterate and only 2.6 percent educated up to 
graduate level [Pakistan (2006)] the state of education in Pakistan does not 
present a rosy picture. To make things worse, it is not just a matter of poor 
‘quantity’ but the quality factor is even more questionable. With the advent of 
demographic transition in Pakistan, the proportion of population entering 
primary school6 ages is bound to decline, followed by a decline in proportion of 
high school ages (Figure XII). A corresponding increase is projected to take 
place in the proportion of post-high school goers in the population, see Figure 
XII.7  From 1960 to 2050, the proportion of population in high school ages does 
                                                 
6‘School’ refers to all levels of education in this paper, be it primary, high (middle to 
intermediate) or post high (degree and professional levels).  
7For share of school going population for different educational levels based on low and high 
variants see Figure A-5.  
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not show the kind of shift that is visible in primary and post-high school ages, 
for which the trends are almost reversed over time (Figure XII). This provides 
an opportunity to invest more in the higher levels of education instead of lower 
levels.  
 
Fig. XII.  Percentage Share of School-going Population for Different 
Educational Levels: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
 
 
Source: Based on medium variant, UN (2005). For low and high variants see Figure A-5.  
 
The question facing Pakistan right now is to first get all its children to 
school and it is only then, with the passage of time, that we can hope them to reach 
higher levels. Countries in East Asia took full advantage of demographic dividend 
because they made timely investments in primary and then secondary education. 
The result of this investment in these countries in education reflected in more 
productive labour which was able to seize the opportunity offered by demographic 
dividend [Phang  (2005); Mason (2005)]. Just by having school going population 
in the “right” proportions does not make the demographic benefits automatic. In 
the absence of any planning it can only result in large segments of population 
which are uneducated, unskilled and ill-equipped to adapt to the changing world 
conditions, at both micro and macro level. 
The point to ponder here is that if universal primary enrolment could not 
be achieved in Pakistan with the current size of the primary school going 
population, what can be expected with the increased numbers that it would 
encounter in the coming decades. And with children not getting enrolled at the 
primary level there can obviously be no ground for population getting higher 
education. Absolute numbers are as important, if not more, as the proportions 
and ratios, and Figure XIII shows that Pakistan faces huge numbers in the 
coming decades to educate.8 The numbers continue to grow till 2040 before 
                                                 
8For population at different educational levels based on low and high variants, see Figure A-6.  
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showing a declining trend, but by then the total population in the school going 
age would have increased to roughly 90 million from a total of only 14 million 
in 1950. From 2000 onwards the numbers grow fastest for the post-high school 
age population, and slowest for primary school age population (see Figure XIII). 
This is typical of the post-demographic transition phase, but for Pakistan the 
dilemma lies in educating all these millions if it wants to reap the benefits of the 
“demographic dividend”.  
Improved human capital is a prerequisite for cashing in on the 
demographic dividend as the sources of higher productivity are becoming 
increasingly dependent on science-based knowledge and information applied to 
production. There is an increasing shift from traditional agricultural and 
manufactured goods to more sophisticated services and agricultural and 
manufactured products. Changes are emerging in the way economic activities 
are organised as a shift is taking place from a mass, standardised production to 
flexible, customised production. All this gives a significant edge to the countries 
that have a labour force having skills and knowledge to adapt to the changing 
market conditions. A country like Pakistan that is yet to solve its primary 
schooling issues can at best have some patches of success but not expect to take 
full advantage of what “demographic dividend” has to offer. 
 
Fig. XIII. Population at Different Educational Levels: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
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Source: Based on medium variant, UN (2005).  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
FOR PAKISTAN 
Demography provides policy-makers a crystal ball to formulate policies 
for tomorrow’s world, believes Bloom, et al. (2001) and very rightly so.  
Capitalising on the demographic dividend in Pakistan needs thoughtful and 
prompt action as 15 years of the “dividend”, which will end by 2045, have 
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already gone by without much gain. Increasing numbers of people entering 
working-ages in the country can act as a double-edged sword—if they do not 
enter the labour force the very logic of “demographic dividend” is defied, but if 
they do become economically active it poses a big challenge to the country’s 
economy to provide them gainful employment. This is quite improbable in the 
absence of sound economic polices and educated and skilled workers. With its 
poor current educational state, training and educating the ever increasing 
population for a changing economic scenario is another test confronting the 
country. Importance of savings cannot be over-emphasised for reasons ranging 
from personal to national, and with the increasing elderly population in the 
absence of any state planned social security system its significance is heightened 
even more. Unless immediate measures are taken the period of ‘demographic 
dividend’ would end with no significant gains and a very complex situation to 
tackle, having an aging population that is uneducated, untrained and little 
savings to rely on.  
To maximise the opportunities to capitalise on the demographic dividend 
ingenious planning is needed both during and after the dividend period. Despite 
a not so encouraging picture at present, all is not lost for Pakistan as 40 years of 
the dividend period are still left, and if a start is made even now, some gains 
could be seized at least. Key areas of focus in this regard include: education; 
public health and family planning; incentives for savings; and most importantly 
creation of an economic environment that encourages employment generation 
and labour flexibility.  
The East Asian countries took full benefit of the demographic dividend 
[Bauer (2001); Phang (2005)]. Successful human resource investment was the 
basic feature behind growing employment and labour productivity growth in 
these countries. With demographic transition, that was very rapid in the 
region, the school-age population stopped growing while the working-age 
population and the tax-base continued to grow rapidly. This had a favourable 
fiscal effect as spending per student was increased without increasing taxes 
per worker. Equally important were policies that first stressed primary and 
then secondary education in these countries. They had a successful research 
programme that led to huge gains in agricultural yield and there was no need 
to absorb additional workers into the sector that had no capacity to provide 
more employment at higher wages. These countries were successful at creating 
new industries and jobs in the service and manufacturing sectors of the 
economy. The region took advantage from an encouraging trading 
environment, but also followed successful export promotion policies. Wise 
macroeconomic policy created an investment-friendly environment that 
ensured the availability of capital needed to expand manufacturing capacity 
initially through foreign funding and then from domestic sources [Bauer 
(2001);  Bloom, et al. (2001) and Phang (2005)]. 
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Lessons are to be learnt by Pakistan from the East Asian experience, and 
utilised after adapting to emerging world and local conditions. As Haque (2006) 
argues, there is a need to rethink the whole growth strategy in Pakistan, and 
implement what he calls a “meritocratic framework” in which success is 
measured by the market and government’s efficiency is gauged by its ability to 
develop institutions that aid the market. Although Haque is talking only about 
economic activity when he says, “institutions need to be built that preserve 
individual freedom, provide security, and facilitate market transactions; the 
government merely provides these institutions, allowing markets to determine 
where economic activity goes” (2006: 26), but this could be applied to other 
fields as well, including education and health, improvements in which are 
crucial to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend.  
Whatever policy implications are discussed in this paper mainly suggest 
interventions that need to be made, not directly by the government but more 
through a mechanism suggested by Haque (2006). Such a strategy would not 
only encourage growth but also reduce direct burden on the resource scarce 
government machinery.  
Improvement of quality of human resources in the country, particularly 
those in the productive ages, is imperative. Education and training are vital to 
determine the productivity of human resources. This cannot be gained by just 
improving the basic enrolment rates but by providing relevant and quality 
education. Interventions are needed to upgrade the educational system by 
including provision to develop skills to meet the demand of a more flexible 
labour force9 in the new economy.  
Can a country grow faster by increased savings? Aghion, Comin, and 
Howitt believe it does, especially if it is a poor country (2006). They argue that 
saving enhances growth in the countries that are not too close to the 
‘technological frontiers’ but the two, saving and growth, do not have any 
relation in the countries that are close to the frontier (2006). “Local saving 
matters for innovation, and therefore growth, because it allows the domestic 
banks to cofinance projects and thus to attract foreign investment; more 
specifically, cofinancing encourages local bank monitoring effort by giving the 
local bank a stake that it will lose if the project fails for want of effort on its 
part” [Aghion, Comin, and Howitt  (2006, p.1)]. Savings have always been low 
in Pakistan, and as pointed out by Haque (2006), large amounts of capital flight 
and informal saving, mainly in real estate, have resulted in response to an 
increased government control over resources. Such forms of private savings are, 
however, not conducive to growth as are those that provide liquidity to the 
banking system. As observed by Aghion, et al. liquidity of the domestic banking 
                                                 
9Flexibility means that employers are able to quickly expand and contract their businesses 
and transfer workers from one area of the business to another more easily. It also refers to a 
workforce that adapts its working methods as the business environment changes. 
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system helps attract foreign investors that brings in the frontier technology that 
triggers TFP and productivity growth (2006). People though tend to save only if 
saving is secure and profitable. To promote saving price stability is critical, as 
motivation to save is higher in environments with low inflation [Hebbel and 
Serven (1997)]. Bad fiscal management, political instability and corruption, 
among other factors, can discourage people to save, making transparency and 
efficiency in financial institutions important for increasing savings. As also 
observed by the IMF, “…a strong and stable macroeconomic framework—that 
delivers low inflation and sustainable public debt levels—together with 
institutional reforms are important elements of an environment conducive to 
domestic saving, capital inflows and capital accumulation” (2004, p. 786).  
To improve and maintain the health of the population is fundamental. 
This becomes even more important keeping in consideration a growing elderly 
population in the country. Health is also an important determinant of economic 
performance, so health of the working age population needs to be taken care of 
as well. Although fertility rate has started to fall in the country there is need for 
creating an environment that is conducive to contraceptives use. The number of 
women in reproductive ages would be at an all time high in the coming decades 
(as can be seen from Figure A-7 in the Appendix), and to maintain the declining 
trend in fertility family planning needs have to be taken care of in the country 
with increased vigour.  
Equal opportunities should exist for both sexes, and reducing, preferably 
abolishing, the gender-gap that exists in education and labour force is essential. 
By improving their educational level, along with lowering fertility, women 
should be encouraged to have a larger share in the labour market. Effective 
capitalisation on the demographic dividend is not possible with half the 
population excluded from the process.  
Employment generation to accommodate the growing number of people 
in working ages would be a major issue for the country. New areas need to be 
explored to provide employment to the ever increasing numbers. Domestic 
commerce can be the most-pro-poor possibility in Pakistan to increase 
employment opportunities [Haque and Waqar (2006)]. According to an estimate 
it employs 40 percent of the work force and contributes approximately 52 
percent to the country’s GDP [Haque and Waqar (2006)]. Encouraging this 
sector would lead to increased employment in the construction activity, 
warehousing, transport, retail shops, and other service industries. The 
employment effect of promoting this sector would be far greater than investing 
in any other sector, as also stressed by Haque and Waqar (2006).   
Demographic dividend is inherently transitory in nature. Due to lack 
of prior planning Pakistan has almost wasted the first 15 years of the 
opportunity demography has offered it. However, age structure will continue 
to be an important force in the country for the next fifty years. How 
   
23 
economic growth is shaped by demographic changes in the coming years 
will depend on the ways policies and institutions respond to the challenges 
and opportunities the future holds. Time is running out to put appropriate 
policies in place, the absence of which may result in large-scale 
unemployment, immense pressure on health and education systems.  In short 
a socio-economic crisis may take place making the demographic dividend 
more of a demographic threat.   
 
APPENDICES 
 
Table A-1 
Timing and Duration of Demographic Dividend in Pakistan:  
Low, Medium, and High Variants 
Year High Low Medium 
1955 –0.62258 –0.62258 –0.52609 
1960 –0.54952 –0.54952 –0.42789 
1965 –0.38683 –0.38683 –0.37843 
1970 0.15326 0.15326 0.19312 
1975 –0.05107 –0.05107 –0.03059 
1980 –0.33706 –0.33706 –0.22713 
1985 –0.08662 –0.08662 –0.0605 
1990 0.36216 0.36216 0.21717 
1995 0.39024 0.39024 0.47665 
2000 0.97300 0.97300 1.01453 
2005 1.00912 1.16912 0.99153 
2010 0.67919 1.05919 0.73162 
2015 0.41792 0.96792 0.56708 
2020 0.22497 0.77559 0.38774 
2025 0.39014 0.65331 0.44499 
2030 0.45992 0.54883 0.41516 
2035 0.39427 0.42021 0.30251 
2040 0.21661 0.30270 0.13607 
2045 0.07610 0.14122 –0.00026 
2050 –0.05870 –0.09060 –0.18090 
Source: Calculations based on UN (2005).  
    Note: Extended positive sign block represents the demographic dividend period for the  respective 
projections.  
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Fig. A-1. Percentage Share of Young, Working-age, and Old Population 
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Source: Based on low and high variants, UN (2005). 
 
 
Fig. A-2. Young, Old, and Total Dependency Ratio: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
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Source: Based on low and high variants, UN (2005).  
 
Fig. A-3.  Available Workers and Those Active in the Labour Market  
2005-2050: Low Variant 
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Source: Based on low variant, UN (2005) and Labour Force Survey 2005-2006.  
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Fig. A-4.  Available Workers and Those Active in the Labour Market,  
2005-2050: High Variant 
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Source: Based on low variant, UN (2005) and Labour Force Survey 2005-2006.  
 
Fig. A-5.  Percentage Share of School-going Population for Different 
Educational Levels: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
Low Variant High Variant 
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Source: Based on low and high variants, UN (2005).  
 
Fig. A-6. Population at Different Educational Levels: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
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Source: Based on low and high variants, UN (2005).  
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Fig. A-7.  Women Aged 15-49 Years: Pakistan, 1950-2050 
(In Millions) 
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Source: Based on low, medium, and high variants, UN (2005).  
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